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Abstract: Index insurance is an alternative to crop insurance that bases payouts on a variable 
that is highly correlated with income but beyond the control of individual households, such as 
rainfall, temperature, or area-yields (i.e., output per hectare in a large area). Index insurance
offers risk protection while avoiding the incentive problems that plague traditional crop 
insurance, and as a result is seen by many as a promising antipoverty tool. However, 
participation in index insurance to this point has generally been in low. In this paper, we explore 
one factor that might potentially depress demand for index insurance: mistaken beliefs among 
farmers with respect to the distribution of the insured risk. Our experiences from an area-yield 
insurance pilot project for cotton farmers in the Pisco valley of Peru suggest that such errors are 
common. Lower demand means that not only are the benefits of index insurance not realized by 
households, but econometric measurement of the these benefits is more difficult due to low 
precision. One way to counteract these effects is a “randomized encouragement design,” i.e., the 
random assignment of positive economic incentives for the purchase of area-yield insurance, 
such as discount coupons. We examine the implications of a randomized encouragement design 
for econometric evaluation. 
Introduction
Much of current applied microdevelopment research is concerned with evaluating the 
impacts of programs on households: e.g., impacts on investment, consumption, or credit demand. 
A great deal has been written about how to recover consistent estimates of these impacts in the 
context of the classical evaluation and selection bias problems. The first arises because in any 
given state of nature, we can only observe households participating or not participating in a 
program, and therefore cannot directly observe household outcomes when they are both in and 
out of a program. The selection bias problem arises when households self-select into a program, 
possibly driven by unobserved factors that are also correlated with outcomes we would like to 
measure; this results in biased estimates of impacts. Less has been written about the nature of the 
household participation decision and its implications for the design and evaluation of new 
programs. In many cases, programs are complex, and the difficulties associated with properly 
evaluating their benefits can give rise to cognitive errors that depress participation. The 
implications of low participation are weaker program benefits for the target population as a 
whole and greater difficulty in estimating impacts, due to imprecise econometric estimates. 2
Giving individuals better economic incentives for participation or exposure to correct 
information may be necessary to counteract these problems. In what follows, we explore these 
issues in the context of index insurance, drawing from our experiences in a pilot program 
designed to explore the impacts of index insurance on small cotton farmers in coastal Peru. Our 
view is that while exposure to correct information regarding program benefits can increase 
participation, economic incentives or “encouragements” may be necessary. Using randomly
assigned incentives to predict program participation, or a “randomized encouragement design,”
can cause program benefits to be more widely realized and make econometric estimates of these 
benefits possible. We summarize what we have observed in the field with respect to the presence 
of cognitive errors that affect household participation decisions. We use a simple economic 
model to demonstrate the effects of one feasible type of error on program takeup and activity 
choice. We then link our economic model to econometric program evaluation. Randomized 
encouragement designs (or any instrumental variables strategy) are sometimes viewed as less 
than ideal from a research perspective, as resulting estimates of impacts may not describe effects 
on the original population of interest. However, in the absence of encouragement, participation 
may be so low as to make inference impossible. We demonstrate these tradeoffs by placing our 
analytical model in an econometric framework. 
Index insurance in the Pisco valley of Peru
Agriculture all over the world is subject to risk. What makes the situation in developing 
economies different is the absence of well-functioning markets to mitigate the effects of risk. 
Informal mechanisms exist, but available empirical evidence suggests they are either inadequate 
or very costly (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Dercon, 2004, Carter et al., 2007). 3
Traditional crop insurance, usually based on compensating farmers for losses relative to a farm-
specific historical level of output or income, has proven extremely expensive in the countries 
where it is offered. Covering all sources of risk without the ability to perfectly monitor farmer 
behavior leads to incentive problems for policyholders, and traditional crop insurance has 
typically seen high ratios of payouts to premium as a result (Skees et al., 1999). This makes 
traditional insurance a less than desirable policy option for governments in developing countries. 
Index insurance is an alternative to traditional crop insurance which ties payouts to a variable 
that is highly correlated with yields or income, but beyond the control of individual farmers. For 
example, an index insurance contract based on rainfall might pay policyholders if precipitation 
were to fall below a certain level, with payouts increasing in the size of the shortfall. Since it 
does not cover all risk at the individual level, index insurance will not offer protection to the 
same extent as traditional crop insurance, but it avoids the incentive problems which have made 
such programs costly and unsustainable. 
While the potential of index insurance is strong, empirical evidence of demand for index 
insurance among poor farmers and impacts of index products on farmer behavior is scarce. In 
order to address this, our research team began a pilot project in the Pisco valley of coastal Peru in 
2008, consisting of the design, marketing, and impact evaluation of an index insurance product 
for cotton farmers. The project is a cooperative effort between UC Davis, the Instituto de 
Estudios Peruanos in Lima, Swiss reinsurer Swiss Re, Peruvian insurer La Positiva, and Caja 
Señor de Luren, the largest formal lender to cotton farmers in Pisco. Cotton is by far the 
dominant crop in the Pisco valley; Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture data show it accounting for 
50-75 percent of sown area over the last decade, while it is planted by an average of 60 percent 
of Pisco’s roughly 5,000 farmers in any given year. Cotton farms tend to be small, with farmers 4
owning an average of 5.15 hectares. While cotton is fairly robust to potential sources of yield 
risk, output can be strongly affected by the El Niño phenomenon, as well as other shocks. El 
Niño occurrences can affect the availability of water for local irrigation infrastructure, and create 
temperature fluctuations that affect levels of pest populations and the rate at which the cotton 
plant develops. El Niño occurrences in 1992-1993 and 1997-1998 resulted in large drops in 
cotton productivity in Pisco, as shown in Figure 1:
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
El Niño is predictable to some extent, as occurrences happen every 3-7 years, but not 
perfectly so. The co-movement between sown area and productivity in Figure 1 suggests that 
farmers are able to anticipate covariate shocks to some degree, although the two do not track 
each perfectly. Other less predictable sources of covariate risk exist as well. The closure of the 
state agricultural bank by the government of Alberto Fujimori in 1992 created a tightening of
access to credit among farmers that was only partly eased over time by expansion of private 
formal lenders into agriculture (Trivelli and Venero, 2007). In 2007 and 2008, world fertilizer 
prices reached record highs, sharply increasing the cost of a key input into cotton production.
Without detailed time series data on household income and consumption, we cannot know 
exactly how these shocks translate into drops in consumption or asset levels. But strong covariate 
shocks do exist, and reliance on cotton in the region suggests that there could be large benefits to 
insuring farmers against systemic shocks to cotton output. The fact that covariate shocks may 
come from climatic as well as macroeconomic factors suggests that the best approach would be 
an index product that can mitigate risk from a variety of factors. 
With these concerns in mind, we designed an area-yield insurance (AYI) product for 
Pisco. If average output per hectare (i.e., or area-yields) falls below the “strike point” of 85 5
percent of the long term mean in the valley, all policy holders receive a payout equal to the size 
of the short fall times the previous year’s market price in Pisco for cotton. The insurance product 
was initially priced using a detrended 20 year time series of data from the Peruvian Ministry of 
Agriculture. This data set and the insurance premium are currently updated every year using our 
own yield survey, the results of which also determine whether or not a shortfall from the strike 
point has occurred. Conducting our own yield survey guarantees timely payouts to policyholders, 
and will eventually allow us to study how yields vary across the valley at a more disaggregated 
level than what is permitted by ministry data. 
Demand for Agropositiva, as the area-yield product is called, has been minimal to this 
point. A lack of sales in the first year can be attributed in part to administrative difficulties that 
led to Agropositiva not being made available until late in the planting season. Low demand 
persisted into the second year, however, despite widespread publicity efforts on the part of La 
Positiva, the insurer marketing the contract. As part of our impact evaluation efforts, we carried 
out a survey of farm households in the Pisco valley in 2008 and 2009. Among households in our 
sample that farmed cotton in 2009, only 3.6 percent purchased Agropositiva (21 of 583). 
Randomly offered discounts on the premium, in some cases large enough to make the product 
actuarially fair, had no effect on demand. While we anticipated low initial takeup of AYI, sales 
have fallen far short of what we had expected.
Whether the benefits of index insurance are realized requires that farmers correctly 
evaluate its benefits. At a superficial level, one of the good qualities of index insurance is its 
simplicity. But consider what a farmer must understand in order to make an informed purchase 
decision. Firstly, there is the indemnity function. Farmers must understand how realizations of 
the insured risk translate into indemnity payments, and how the size of these payments is 6
affected by the level of coverage purchased. Secondly, there is the distribution of the insured 
risk, and by extension, the distribution of the indemnity function. For example, purchasing 
insurance will involve a sacrifice of expected returns in exchange for lower variability of 
income, unless premiums are highly subsidized; understanding the expected payouts associated 
with an index insurance contract is necessary to properly evaluate this tradeoff. Lastly, farmers 
need to understand co-movement of their individual incomes or crop yields and the indemnity 
function. If a farmer incorrectly perceives the co-movement between her income and the index, 
she will not be able to properly evaluate the benefits of index insurance, regardless of how well 
she understands the distribution of outcomes she faces at the individual level.
There are then several potential ways in which farmers can err and improperly value the 
benefits of index insurance, and potentially depress demand. The possibility for errors is 
exacerbated by low levels of education and lack of experience with the formal financial sector. 
We did not fully appreciate these possibilities when we began our own index insurance research 
program, although we did make strong efforts to educate farmers about Agropositiva and AYI in 
general. Prior to the first year of Agropositiva’s availability, we invited randomly selected 
farmers to participate in experimental “games” designed to simulate an AYI contract for the 
Pisco valley; 400 farmers ended up attending, around 50 percent of those invited.
1 The games 
included real monetary incentives. Farmers played for a total of 12 rounds or “seasons” with
average winnings amounting to two days pay for an agricultural worker. Results of questions 
meant to gauge the level of comprehension of AYI following the games were our first clue that 
cognitive errors might depress demand for AYI. During the games, farmers were arranged into 
groups or “valleys.” At the start of each round, farmers chose from three options: a low risk 
activity mean to simulate cotton farming via self-financing, a riskier option mimicking cotton 
                                                
1 See Galarza (2009) for a detailed description of the games and results. 7
farming with a formal loan, and a third option that bundled the loan with AYI. In each round of 
the game, participants faced two sources of risk to their winnings: an idiosyncratic shock that 
was specific to each person, and a covariate shock that was shared by every member of his or her 
group; purchasing AYI mitigated the risk of the covariate shock but forced farmers to sacrifice a 
portion of expected returns. While it was repeatedly emphasized that AYI was in no way 
correlated with the idiosyncratic risk, over 25 percent of farmers responded incorrectly when 
asked if the individual risk affected payouts. 
Informal discussions following the games revealed other potential difficulties. Farmers 
whose average yields were higher than those of the valley as a whole were skeptical of the 
insurance, stating that their own yields never dropped that low, and thus could not foresee 
Agropositiva ever paying out. Even farmers with average yields around the valley level mean 
stated that there was little chance of area-yields ever dropping below the strike point, and viewed 
the premium as much too high given this low perceived probability. This is despite the fact that
all seemed to agree that the bad El Niño years shown in Figure 1 were devastating in terms of 
production losses. Farmers seemed to hold the contradictory views that El Niño was very 
harmful to production, yet yields could never fall below the strike point. 
In order to delve deeper into these issues, we conducted focus group discussions with 
farmers following the second year of the project. Farmers continued to insist that the strike point 
was far too low relative to yields in the valley, with this view most pronounced among 
individuals with highly productive land. Other issues came to the forefront as well. The Pisco 
valley is thought of by farmers and agricultural extension workers as consisting of three zones: la 
parte alta, la parte media, and la parte baja. Farmers in the focus groups insisted that production 
conditions in the three zones were substantially different, and that la parte baja in particular was8
characterized by lower productivity and different sources of risk than the other two zones. Given 
this perceived dissimilarity of production conditions, farmers did not see an index that combined 
yields in all three zones as useful from a risk management standpoint.
Given that there is only one lengthy time series for cotton yields in Pisco, it is difficult to
evaluate claims made by farmers with respect to the size of the strike point and the mean of area-
yields. But we can evaluate claims with respect to heterogeneity of production across the valley, 
as in Figure 2:
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
This figure was drawn using Ministry of Agriculture data through 2006, while remaining years 
are drawn from data we collected. Data earlier than 1987 are only available at the valley level, 
and therefore we can only look at this shorter time series. Yields in the three zones have very 
strong co-movement. All correlation coefficients between and any two of the three zones are 
higher than 0.91. The lone exception in this pattern of similar outcomes appears to be 2007, 
where area-yields in the parte baja where substantially lower than elsewhere. But the overall 
trend of similar productivity levels is clear.
The household survey provides additional evidence against the perception of strong 
heterogeneity across the three zones. We asked all households their yields per hectare in a 
normal year, a bad year, and a good year. The results are averaged within each zone in Table 1:
[INSERT TABLE 1]
T-tests show no statistically significant differences across zones for output in normal, bad, and 
good years. These figures were computed by weighting each household’s self-reported figure by 
the percentage of all land in the zone owned by that household, rather than weighting by a 
measure of share of sown area. The rental market in Pisco is quite active, and weights based on 9
an average share of sown area might yield different results. In any case, the combination of 
Figure 2 and Table 1 suggest that there are no glaring differences in productivity or variability of 
production across the three zones. Good, bad, and normal production conditions appear to occur
in the same years for all three zones, and output associated with these conditions seem to be very 
similar in each region.
Multiple data sources therefore appear to contradict claims made by farmers with respect 
to risk and cotton production in Pisco, and despite intensive efforts to provide accurate 
information with respect to the benefits of AYI, these disparities persist. The question is what the 
implications of these errors might be. In what follows, we model the impacts of one particular 
type of error on demand for AYI and activity choice, and then later explore how this error might 
affect econometric analysis of the impacts of AYI on households that purchase it. The cognitive 
error we use is misperception of the mean of area-yields. Farmers are assumed to believe that the 
mean is higher than it actually is, and as a result view the AYI strike point as being a smaller 
percentage of the mean of area-yields than what is actually the case. As described above, farmers 
have repeatedly told us that area-yields will “never” fall below the strike point of 85 percent of 
the mean, suggesting that the error used in our model is a feasible one; we do not allow for any 
other type of cognitive error. 
A model of demand for index insurance and beliefs about the distribution of the insured risk
The economy consists of N farmers, each with the option of participating in wage labor or
planting cotton on a single hectare of land. Participating in wage labor guarantees a risk free 
return of w. Cotton is a risky activity, as output in each period is vulnerable to a shock c  that is 10
common to all N households, and an idiosyncratic shock i  . In this model, we will define the 
common shock c  as deviations of average output per hectare, or area-yields, from their mean:
t ct q     (1)
We will hold the price of the crop fixed at unity, making output and income identical. 
The cotton production function for farmer i at time t is:
it ct i it q        (2)
This production function is taken from Miranda (1991). The shocks c  and i  are continuous, 
jointly independent, and symmetrically distributed about a mean of zero. Both terms are 
identically distributed across farmers, although for our purposes i  need not be homoscedastic. 
While all households have the same mean level of output , the variance of cotton is 
heteroscedastic. From (2), the variance of output can be written as:
2 2 2 2
i c i i q         (3)
Total variance of yields can be decomposed into a component due to variation in area-yields,
2 2
c i    , and another due to all other sources of risk,
2
i   . 
The heteroscedasticity of q is driven by differences in sensitivity to the covariate 
shock c  , as captured by i  . The parameter i  is equal to the covariance of farmer yields qi with 











To see this, consider running regressions by household in which the estimating equation is given 
by (2).  Taken together, the individual i  parameters form the population level distribution of , 11
which is symmetric and centered at unity with a variance of
2
  . In the long run, the value 
of i  for each farmer would likely be a choice variable, as pointed out by Chambers and Quiggin 
(2002). In the present context we will assume these parameters are fixed. 
The decision whether or not to plant cotton will be driven by each farmer’s ex-ante 
evaluation of the benefits of planting cotton versus those of wage labor. Here we will assume 
that farmer preferences follow a mean-standard deviation specification.
2 Denote by planti=1 the 
decision to grown cotton by farmer i, and planti=0 participation in wage labor. Expected utility 
of planting cotton is:
 
2 2 2 2
1 , i c i i plant i EU            (5)
and for wage labor we have:
2
0 , w EU
i plant i   (6)
The functional form used in (5) is taken from Nelson and Escalante (2004). Squaring the mean 
implies that farmer preference are characterized by constant relative risk aversion, where the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by .
Whether or not a farmer decides to plant cotton will be determined by her i  . 
Specifically, there is a range of i  values for which the expected utility of growing cotton is 
higher than that of wage labor. Setting the difference of (5) and (6) to zero and solving 
for i  results in the following decision rule:
                                                
2 Normally this would require making assumptions over the distribution of yields or the nature of the ex-post utility 
function so as to insure that the two-moment representation of preferences is consistent with expected utility or some 
generalization thereof, as shown by Meyer (1987), Sinn (1983), and Chamberlain (1983). Here, we are less 
concerned with following the axioms of expected utility than with creating a simple, coherent model. In any case, 
two-moment preference functions often yield close approximation of expected utility results, even when the criteria 



















   
 
 
   (7)
Farmers with values of i  outside of this interval will participate in wage labor. 
The area-yield insurance contract
Farmers would be more inclined to move out of wage labor if the risk associated with 
growing cotton could be reduced, and any such shift would increase expected output in the 
economy. Area-yield insurance is one way in which this might be accomplished. An AYI 
contract will consist of an indemnity function and a premium. In this model the indemnity pays 
farmers the covariate shock whenever this shock is positive, i.e., when area-yields fall short of 
the mean , and zero otherwise:
] , 0 max[ ct t I   (8)
The premium, , is equal to the expected indemnity, r, plus a loading term, l:
      l P E l I E l r c c c         0 0 |     (9)
where   0 |  c c E   is the expected value of the covariate shock, conditional on c  being positive. 
The expected utility of insurance purchasers will be affected through the expected value 
of the indemnity, as well as its variance and its covariance with the common shock, c  . The 
variance of the indemnity function is:
     
2 2 2 0 0 | I E P c c I c          (10)
The covariance of the indemnity with c  is:
        0 0 | 0 |
2 2
,      c c c c I P E
c c         (11)13
Equations (10) and (11) are derived equations (14’) and (16’) of the appendix. Along with the 
value of i  , the covariance term determines the risk reduction potential of AYI for each 
individual farmer.
Adding the parameters given in (9), (10), and (11) to the expected utility of planting 
cotton gives us the expected utility of planting cotton with AYI. Denote by di=1 the decision to 
buy AYI and di=0 the decision not to do so. Expected utility conditional on planting cotton and 
buying AYI is:
   
c i c i i I i I i d plant i l EU            ,
2 2 2 2 2
1 , 1 , 2         (12)
Farmers will compare between (5), (6), and (12) when making decisions about activity choice 
and insurance. 
The decision to buy area-yield insurance
In order to identify decision rules for the purchase of AYI, and the possibility of new 
decision rules with respect to activity choice following the introduction of AYI, we must 
examine the difference in expected utility between planting cotton with insurance and planting 
cotton without insurance, as well as the difference in expected utility between planting cotton 
with insurance and wage labor. The former is:
       
2 2 2 2
,
2 2 2 2 2
1 , 0 1 , 1 1
2
i c c i c
i i i i
i I i I i
plant d plant d
l
EU EU
                         
       
(13)
Ignoring the possibility of wage labor for the moment, for a farmer who was already planting 














Satisfying this inequality guarantees that equation (13) is strictly positive, and therefore that the 
farmer gains in terms of expected utility from the purchase of AYI.
Now consider the difference between expected utility with AYI and wage labor. This 
difference is:
   
2
,
2 2 2 2 2
0 , 0 1 , 1 2 2 w l EU EU
c i c i i i i I i I i plant d plant d                          (15)
This is a concave function with respect to i  with a global maximum. If there any farmers are 
better off planting cotton and purchasing AYI than participating in wage labor, then there exists 
at least one value of i  for which 2  >0. Assume that this is the case. This implies that there is a 
finite interval of i  values within which the difference given in (15) is strictly positive. This 
interval is bounded by the values of i  that set (15) equal to zero. Solving for these values yields:
       





































In order for a farmer to plant cotton and purchase AYI, her i  values must satisfy (14) and 
lie within the interval given in (16). In other words, the set of i  values for which planting cotton 
and purchasing AYI is optimal is defined by the intersection of (14) and (16). This set will be 
empty and AYI demand zero if the lower bound given in (14) is greater than the upper bound 
given in (16). That is, if the maximum value of i  for which buying AYI and planting cotton 
gives higher expected utility than wage labor is lower than the smallest value of i  for which 
buying AYI and planting cotton gives higher expected utility than cotton alone, no one will buy 
AYI. All farmers with values of i  such that cotton and insurance yield higher expected utility 15
than cotton alone would be better off working in wage labor. If this is not the case and the set is 












































   
   (17)
where x is defined as in equation (16). As shown in equations (1’) through (10’) in the appendix, 
the size of this interval is increasing with respect to the covariance of the indemnity and the 
covariate shock,
c I   , , decreasing with respect to the loading term, l, and decreasing with respect 
to the variance of the indemnity,
2
I  . Greater risk reduction via a larger covariance term leads to 
higher participation in AYI, as we would expect. A higher loading term makes AYI more costly, 
driving demand down, while greater variation in the indemnity lowers demand for insurance by 
offsetting its risk reduction benefits.
Area-yield insurance and activity choice
Prior to the introduction of AYI, farmers choosing to plant cotton rather than participate 
in wage labor had values of i  falling within the bounds given in (7). Once AYI is available, the 
new set of i  values which make planting cotton optimal will be given by the union of the 
intervals in (17) (i.e., the set of i  values for which planting cotton and purchasing AYI is 
optimal) and (7). The lower bound of (7) is negative, and since all farmers who benefit from AYI 
must have i  >0, it follows that the lower bound of (7) is less than the lower bound of (17). 
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As we would expect, all increases in the share of farmers planting cotton will come from farmers 
who previously deemed cotton as too risky relative to wage labor, but whose output levels 
covary positively with area-yields. Whether there is any increase in cotton planting will depend 
on the upper bound of (18), which cannot be determined without assigning parameter values. 
AYI must offer enough risk protection to induce farmers with large i  values to switch to 
planting cotton. The same changes in the parameters of the AYI contract that increased the size 
of the set of i  values for which purchasing AYI and planting cotton were optimal will increase 
the size of the interval in (18) if its upper bound corresponds to the upper bound given in (17). 
Otherwise, changes in the AYI contract will have no effect on the number of farmers planting 
cotton.
Farmer errors and demand for area-yield insurance
If farmers know the different means, variance, and covariance terms detailed above, then 
any farmer who is better off with AYI will purchase it. Our field experience in Peru suggests that 
at least in some circumstances, common perceptions may strongly differ from reality. To 
introduce the possibility that farmers make mistakes with respect to evaluating the insurance 
contract, we will assume that farmers shift the location of the distribution ofqto the right, 
resulting in a higher mean for area-yields:
   
* *
    v q E q E (19)
where v is the size of the location shift and:
0
*    g   (20)
No other errors are introduced into the model. The 
* indicates a parameter or random variable as 
perceived by the farmer rather than its true value, i.e., the random variable according to the 17
subjective distribution held by farmers. This mistake is common to all farmers in the economy. 
The error shifts the distribution of area-yields to the right, and as a result the definition of the 
subjective covariate shock
*
c   is different from that of c  , but their distributions are identical, so 
that:
    0
* * *    q E E c   (21)
and
   
2 2 *
c c E     (22)
Since the distributions of c  and
*
c  are identical, we can use the moments of the former 
when evaluating the AYI contract under farmer misperceptions with respect to the mean of area-
yields. Note that a change in the location of the distribution ofqwill not affect the covariance 
between output for farmer i and the covariate shock c  . Individual i  parameters are therefore 
unaffected by the error. 
It might appear that since the distributions of the true covariate shock c  and the 
subjective covariate
*
c  shock are identical, the impact of the change in definition of the covariate 
shock on the AYI contract will be trivial. This is not the case, however, as the size of the error g
can strongly affect how farmers view the strike point for the AYI contract. Suppose farmers are 
told that the AYI contract will pay out whenever area-yields fall short of , but believe that the 
mean of area-yields is equal to
*  . Noting again that the distributions of c  and
*
c  are identical, 
the perceived indemnity function given farmer errors is:
  g I ct t    , 0 max
* (23)18
Mistaken beliefs regarding the mean of area-yields cause farmers to view the AYI contract as 
having a higher strike point than is actually the case. This leads farmers to perceive a higher 
loading term. The expected indemnity under the correct distribution of area-yields is:
         
 
   

































c  is the upper bound of the support of c  , and   c f  is its probability density function. In 
this case we have assumed that c  is continuous, but this does not affect our results. Under the 
subjective distribution of area-yields, (24) becomes:
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The difference between (25) and (24) is:
        0
0
0 0
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Farmer errors lead to a larger perceived loading term, (l+h), which is an increasing function of 
the size of the error, g.19
While the impact on the price of the AYI contract is clear, a higher subjective mean of 
area-yields does not unequivocally reduce the risk-reduction potential of AYI. As shown in the 
appendix this ambiguity stems from the fact that while the higher strike point reduces the 
covariance of the indemnity and the covariate shock, it may also reduce the variance of 
indemnity. The net effect of the increase in loading and the change in total variance due to 
purchasing AYI given the subjective mean of area-yields cannot be signed without choosing 
explicit parameter values, as shown in the appendix.
Since the incorrect subjective mean of area-yields affects how farmers perceive the 
expected return and risk reduction offered by AYI, it may also affect the size of the interval 
of i  values for which it is optimal to purchase AYI, and as a result, diminish any possible 
increases in the number of farmers planting cotton. Incorporating the subjective distribution of 
area-yields into the definition of this interval given in (17) gives us:
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   (28)
where x
*=          
2 2 2 2 2 2
,
* * I I i c c w h l                 .
As shown in the appendix, the ambiguity mentioned above with respect to the effects of farmer 
errors on the risk reduction of AYI also means that we cannot determine how the size of g affects 
the width of the interval given in (28). In what follows, we assign values to the parameters of our 
model in order to examine this question further. 
Assigning parameter values to the model
To parameterize the model, we use two data sources for cotton farming in the coastal 
region of Pisco in Peru. The mean of area-yields, , and the variance of the covariate shock,20
2
c   , are estimated using the 20 year time series of area-yields for the Pisco valley from the 
Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture shown in Figure 1, combined with two years of yield data 
collected by our research team. The area-yields time series was detrended using a linear trend, 
and and
2
c   are estimated using their sample counterparts from this detrended series. The pure 
risk premium, r, and the covariance of the indemnity with the covariate shock,
c I   , , are 
estimated assuming  
2 , 0 ~
c N c    where
2
c   is estimated as described above. The loading term l
is set to 10 percent of the pure risk premium. 
The return to the safe activity, w, is set equal to 490. Based on our household survey, this 
is approximately one tenth of what a person in the Pisco valley could earn as a day laborer 
during the three month planting season and the three month harvest season. In the household 
survey data, average farm size is around 5 hectares and the average price received per kilogram 
of cotton is 2 Peruvian soles. Since the model uses a farm size of 1 hectare and a price of unity 
for cotton, we divide wage laborer income as indicated by the data by 10 to put cotton and labor 
income as used in the simulation in the same units. The use of a constant relative risk aversion 
specification for the expected utility function guarantees that this rescaling will not affect our 
results. 
To estimate the idiosyncratic variance component,
2
i   , and the variance of ,
2
  , the 
linear production function given in (2) was estimated via maximum likelihood using a four years
of panel data on cotton parcels in the Pisco valley, covering the years from 2002 to 2005. These 
data are taken from the National Survey of Production and Sales survey collected by the 
Ministry of Agriculture. This requires assuming that all random components of the right hand 
side of (2) are normally distributed. The data are for parcels rather than individual farmers, and 21
thus estimates may differ from the underlying farmer-level parameters. But we do not need exact 
values of these parameters for the purposes of this paper, just reasonable values to guide our 
simulations. Our parameter values are given in Table 2 below. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
The values of these parameters will determine the portion of farmers that decide to purchase AYI
as well as those that participate in cotton farming.
Figure 3 shows how the set of i  values for which it is optimal to purchase AYI changes 
with respect g, along with the concomitant fall in demand for insurance:
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
The bounds on i  for AYI purchasers shrink rapidly with the size of the error, and the interval 
closes completely for errors larger than 5 percent of . This is paralleled by the rapid drop in 
demand for AYI, from 43 percent participation when there is no error down to zero when the 
error passes 5 percent.   
Figure 4 shows how the share of farmers planting cotton changes with respect to the size 
of the error made by farmers, g:
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
As the size of g increases, participation in cotton farming drops from 82 percent to 73.6 percent. 
When farmers correctly perceive the mean of area-yields , participation in cotton farming is 8.4 
percent higher than it would be if AYI were not available. Increasing the size of the error g
steadily erodes this increase until it is reduced to zero. 
As argued in the introduction, correctly evaluating the benefits of participation in AYI or 
any other development program may require detailed knowledge and complex reasoning on the 
part of eligible individuals. The analytical model and simulation presented here show that one 22
type of error suggested via conversations with small farmers in Peru may strongly depress 
demand for AYI. For the sake of simplicity, it was assumed that all farmers make the same error. 
The result is that farmers do not enjoy the benefits of a program that might be a powerful tool 
against a source of risk that deepens poverty and discourages productive investment. Impacts on 
demand for AYI might be less extreme if this assumption were adjusted, but farmers who 
incorrectly believe the mean to be larger than it is would still undervalue AYI, and therefore be 
less likely to buy it. 
If the benefits of index insurance are being foregone due to cognitive errors, two potential 
solutions immediately come to mind. The first is information campaigns or targeted marketing to 
try and correct mistaken perceptions that decrease demand. The second is changing economic 
incentives for participation in index insurance via subsidizing the premium. While our research 
team was not successful promoting demand for AYI through either of these mechanisms, others 
have had more success. In their study of rainfall insurance in India, Cole et al. (2008) study a 
variety of randomized treatments meant to increase demand for index insurance, or “randomized 
encouragements.” These included price and informational treatments, as well as other 
manipulations. The treatments that included informational content might correct cognitive errors 
of the sort explored above, while reducing the price would offset the perceived increase in 
loading due to cognitive errors. Informational treatments included education about how rainfall 
in millimeters (the basis of the payout mechanism in the contract) translated into soil moisture on 
individual farms, and how this varied according to soil type. All treatments had significant 
effects, and in the expected directions. The price treatment was administered to households that 
also watched an informational video, and estimated impacts of this treatment capture than just 
the effect of price. Resulting estimates of the price elasticity vary by study region, ranging from 23
0.66 on the low end to 0.875. It appears possible to identify what sorts of information can 
increase demand for index insurance, and to what degree incentives must be manipulated to 
convince farmers to purchase it. Identifying what these mechanisms might be is something that 
ought to be done prior to econometric analysis. Economic theory, preliminary data collection,
and focus group discussions such as those carried out by our research team in Peru can be helpful 
in this capacity.
Increasing demand for index insurance in the context of program evaluation
If farmers can benefit from index insurance but are not doing so, then any tool that can 
raise demand should be explored. But as pointed out in the introduction, empirical evidence of 
these benefits is scant. Measuring the impacts of index insurance on outcomes of interest should 
therefore be a goal of program evaluation. If this is the case, then the question of what tools we 
should use to raise demand in the context of research design becomes more nuanced. Consider 
program evaluation in the context of index insurance. Ideally, for each individual we could 
measure the level of some outcome of interest y with and without index insurance. The 
difference between these two outcomes is the individual level “treatment effect,” where the 
treatment is having index insurance:
0 1
i i i y y y    (29)
Here
1
i y denotes the level of the outcome y for person i with index insurance and
0
i y is the outcome 
without insurance. Assuming away the existence of spillover effects, (29) captures all relevant 
individual-level impacts of index insurance. If we could observe or consistently estimate these 
individual level effects, we could estimate the distribution of outcomes with and without index 
insurance, as well as the distribution of individual level treatment effects. This is impossible, 24
however, due to what is known as the “evaluation problem”: we can only observe individuals at 
any given point in time with or without the treatment.
As an alternative, we could estimate average treatment effects via a comparison of 
individuals with and without index insurance. A direct comparison of this sort will yield 
inconsistent estimates, however, due to the selection problem: the decision to purchase index 
insurance may be driven at least in part by unobserved heterogeneity that may also be correlated 
with outcomes of interest. For example, in our model of area-yield insurance, the individual 
level i  parameters are unobserved and correlated with the decision to purchase AYI. If these 
parameters are also correlated with the outcome variable in an econometric specification, 
estimated impacts will be inconsistent.
Another method that can yield consistent estimates of average treatment effects is directly
randomizing individuals into and out of the index insurance program. Compelling people to 
purchase or not purchase insurance is probably not feasible, so this strategy will not be discussed 
further. A fourth method consists of randomizing a variable that affects demand for index 
insurance without affecting the variable to be used as the outcome. Comparisons of the groups 
formed by these randomizations can yield consistent estimates of average treatment effects.
However, the average treatment effect that is estimated may vary depending on the 
randomization strategy used. This is because the randomization strategy chosen will affect the 
composition of the comparison groups. Unless impacts are the same for all individuals or vary 
randomly in a way that is not correlated with the decision to buy insurance, the average outcome 
in each group will depend on group composition (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007). 
For example, consider a randomization of eligibility to purchase index insurance. At the 
individual level, this would require some sort of mechanism by which randomly chosen persons 25
are not allowed to purchase index insurance, while others are left to purchase it or not purchase 
as they please. Denote by zi=1 random assignment to the eligible group whose members can 
purchase AYI at the market price   l r    , and zi=0 random assignment to the ineligible group. 
Note that since eligibility is assigned randomly, the share of eligible farmers buying index 
insurance is an unbiased estimate of the proportion of farmers who would buy index insurance if 
it were made available to all farmers in the population. Suppose that a proportion p of the eligible 
group would buy index insurance. We could then estimate the following average treatment 
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where di=1 denotes having purchased index insurance and   1 | 1   i i z d P is the proportion of 
eligible farmers purchasing index insurance. This is the change in the expected outcome (or, 
alternatively, the average change in the outcome) with respect to a change in the share of farmers 
with AYI from 0 to p. Note that since eligibility is assigned randomly,    1 |  i z y E is equivalent 
to the expected value of y in the population when a proportion p of farmers buys AYI, 
with   0 |  i z y E defined similarly for the case of zero participation in AYI among the population 
of farmers. Differences between these two expected values are due to changes in y among 
farmers who would buy AYI at the market price if they were eligible to do so. Equation (30) can 
be estimated by replacing each component with its sample counterpart. 
As stated above, different randomization strategies yield different estimated average 
treatment effects. The randomization of eligibility described here makes it possible to estimate26
the average treatment effect of index insurance on farmers who would buy it if it were made 
available to all farmers at the premium . From the perspective of informing policymaking, this 
is arguably the most interesting average treatment effect, as it captures the average change in the 
outcome that would occur due to the introduction of index insurance. For this reason it will be 
referred to in what follows as the “Policy Relevant Treatment Effect,” or PRTE, using the 
nomenclature of Heckman and Vytlacil (2007). 
Unfortunately, when participation in the program being evaluated is low, it may not be 
feasible to estimate significant impacts based on a randomization of eligibility, even if impacts 
are large in magnitude. The reason is that low participation sharply increases the size of the 
standard error of the estimate of (30), which can be estimated as:
 
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where n is the size of the sample used in the analysis,
2
y  is the variance of the observed outcome
y, R
2 is the goodness of fit from the regression of the y on z, and 1  i z  is the proportion of the 
sample chosen to be eligible to buy index insurance. The standard error increases linearly with 
the participation rate p, and low participation may cause (31) to explode as a result. 
Now consider a “randomized encouragement design,” or randomly varying the incentives 
for the purchase of index insurance faced by individuals. Possibilities include randomizing the 
insurance premium via discounts or “coupons” for the purchase of index insurance, or the sorts 
of randomized information treatments used by Cole et al described above. Denote by ci=1 
assignment to the encouraged group, and ci=0 assignment to control, and suppose that a 27
proportion p” of the former group participates, while a share p’ of the latter buy index insurance.
This type of design will allow us to estimate the following:
   
   
       
' "
' 1 | " 1 |
0 | 1 1 | 1
0 | 1 |
p p
p d P y E p d P y E
c d P c d P
c y E c y E i i
i i i i
i i

    

    
  
(32)
In addition to having no direct effect on the outcome, the randomized encouragement c must 
satisfy the following assumption for equation (32) to represent an average treatment effect:
i c d c d
c d c d
i i i i
i i i i
all for  0 | 0 1 | 0
and    1 | 1 0 | 1
    
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(33)
In other words, if a farmer would purchase AYI without a coupon, then she would also do so 
with a coupon, and if she would not participate with a coupon, she would also not do so if she 
were not to receive a coupon. This is known as the monotonicity assumption, and was first 
introduced by Imbens and Angrist (1994). It implies that the randomized encouragement can 
never induce farmers to not buy index insurance. It may have no effect, or induce them to buy 
insurance, but cannot push them out of the program.
3
If monotonicity is satisfied, then equation (32) is a “Local Average Treatment Effect” 
(LATE). This LATE represents the change in the expected outcome due to increasing the rate of 
participation in index insurance from p’ to p”. This increase in participation is caused by the 
encouragement c, which induces some farmers to buy AYI who would otherwise not do so. For 
individuals whose purchase decision is unaffected by the encouragement, the outcome y is
identical when the proportion of farmers with AYI is p’ or p”. As a result, the LATE given in 
(32) captures the expected impact of index insurance on farmers who are induced to buy index 
insurance by the encouragement. 
                                                
3 See page 434 of Angrist and Imbens (1995) for a simple explanation of why this assumption is needed.28
Note that whether or not monotonicity is satisfied will vary from treatment to treatment, 
and cannot be directly tested using data. Consider the random distribution of discount coupons 
for purchasing index insurance. It seems reasonable to assume that a lower price will only serve 
to encourage farmers to purchase index insurance, and therefore will satisfy monotonicity. This 
may not be the case, however, with information treatments. Clarifying the benefits of index 
insurance may push some farmers towards purchasing index insurance, but have the opposite 
effect on others. One could imagine that this tendency might be correlated with unobserved 
heterogeneity such as the i  used in the model above, and could therefore not be controlled. 
However, other sorts of informational treatments may indeed satisfy monotonicity. The point is 
that this may be hard to justify and cannot be taken for granted, whereas with a variable such as 
price the argument is much simpler. This must be taken into account when designing an 
encouragement.
Even if monotonicity is satisfied, the LATE has other flaws. As stated above, the LATE 
captures average impacts on individuals induced to buy index insurance by the encouragement. 
The composition of this group will not in general be identical to that of the group of farmers who 
would buy index insurance were it made available, i.e., the farmers for whom impacts are 
captured by the PRTE. These two groups may be quite different, as the former needs some sort 
of extra incentive to buy the insurance, while the latter group would buy it at the market price. 
As a result, the LATE will not in general coincide with the PRTE. What a randomized 
encouragement designs can do is make it easier to estimate statistically significant effects, by 
increasing the share of farmers purchasing index insurance. The formula for the standard error of 
the LATE is:29
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where 1  i c  is the proportion of farmers randomly selected to receive a coupon. A strong enough 
encouragement could make the difference p”- p’ small enough to yield significant estimates, 
where the rate participation in the randomization of eligibility is always fixed at p. The estimated 
LATE can tell us something about impacts of index insurance on farmers. Although this may not 
correspond exactly to what we would like to learn, increasing what we know about the effects of 
index insurance on small farmers seems preferable to being inflexible about what parameters we 
choose to estimate, and learning less as a result. 
Randomizing eligibility and randomized encouragements: simulating the tradeoffs
To simulate the tradeoff between the bias of the LATE with respect to the PRTE and the 
gains in precision offered by randomized encouragements, we return to the model economy of 
cotton farmers used above, and assume that farmers mistakenly believe the mean of area-yields 
to be
*  > . Suppose we are to econometrically evaluate the impact of buying index insurance 
on farm profits; we will ignore production costs for simplicity. Impacts of index insurance on 
profits will be driven by increases in the number of farmers planting cotton rather than 
participating in wage labor. Assume that in the year in which we will carry out our evaluation, 
area-yields will be 10 percent higher than the historical mean. Profits for farmer i are:
  it i it q       10 . (35)
if she chooses to plant cotton, and:
490  w (36)30
if she participates in wage labor. Equation (35) is a realization of the production function given
in equation (2) above. For each farmer the shock it  is a draw from a mean-zero normally 
distributed random variable, with a variance of 242,068 taken from the results of the estimates 
listed in Table 2. The parameter i  and the shock it  are unobserved. The outcome of interest is 
therefore correlated with unobserved heterogeneity ( i  ) that will also drive the decision to buy 
area-yield insurance. A research design is needed that generates variation in demand for AYI 
while not affecting the outcome, and creates a large enough difference in participation between 
the treatment and control groups so as to yield precise estimates of average impacts. 
In this case, the PRTE is the average change in farm profits due to buying AYI among 
those who would purchase it at the market price. This parameter can be estimated by randomly 
assigning eligibility for the purchase of index insurance, e.g., by randomly disallowing farmers 
who want to purchase the insurance from doing so. It would then be calculated using average 
outcomes in the treatment and control groups, and the participation rate in the treatment group, 
as shown in equation (30). Figure 5 maps the PRTE and the bounds of its 95 percent confidence 
interval as a function of the size of the error made by farmers, g:
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE]
This is the PRTE for a randomization of eligibility that assigns half of a sample of n=1,000 
farmers to treatment and half to control, in order to maximize precision. The sample is drawn 
from the economy described by the parameters in Table 2. The PRTE grows with the size of the 
error; since area-yields are higher than average, profits are positively correlated with i  , and 
increasing g drives farmers with low values of i  out of the AYI program, making the impact of 
AYI on profits larger as a result. When the error passes 3.5 percent of , the PRTE is no longer 
significant, despite little change in the magnitude of the effect. 31
Now consider a randomized coupon scheme. Figure 6 graphs the LATE as calculated 
using equation (32), its 95 percent confidence interval, and the bias of the LATE relative to the 
PRTE as a function of the size of the coupon. The error g is fixed at 5 percent of :
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE]
Low values of the coupon result in extremely wide bounds on the confidence interval; hence 
only coupon values ranging from 10 to 50 are included in the figure. When the coupon reaches a 
value of 33, or approximately 21 percent of the total premium of 159, the estimated LATE
becomes statistically significant. Over this range of the coupon, the difference between the 
LATE and PRTE remains fairly steady, although it is substantial. It is negative, as we would 
expect, given that i  is positively correlated with profits. Farmers who only participate if they 
receive a coupon tend to have lower values of i  than farmers who would buy AYI at the market 
price, and therefore will also have lower profits in a year with high area-yields. In this particular 
example, the LATE and PRTE do not correspond, but only using the former enables us to 
estimate significant impacts of AYI on an outcome of interest. 
This simulation could have used an information treatment as the encouragement, as 
correcting misperceptions with respect to could only make farmers more likely to purchase 
AYI. If we had allowed for both positive and negative errors, or an error associated with the 
values of i  , this would have no longer been the case. The treatment would have encouraged 
some while discouraging others from purchasing AYI. The resulting estimates of how 
information can affect demand for AYI would be interesting and valuable, but would not be
suitable as part of an analysis of impacts of index insurance on outcomes. 
Conclusion32
This paper explored the implications of cognitive errors for willingness to participate in 
an index insurance program. Experiences in Peru lead us to believe that these sorts of errors are 
widespread. This must be taken into account at every step of research design, from the structure 
of the index contract itself, to the way in which variation in demand is generated for the purpose 
of program evaluation. The analytical model presented here and the simulation based upon it 
demonstrate that one type of feasible error, mistakes with regard to the mean of area-yields, can 
exert a strong effect on participation. On one hand, if we believe that area-yield insurance and 
index insurance in general are valuable risk management tools, seemingly correctable 
misconceptions are leading farmers to miss out on large potential benefits. On the other, little is 
known about the size and nature of the benefits stemming from the purchase of index insurance, 
and anything that depresses demand makes it more difficult to enhance our knowledge of these 
effects. Randomized encouragement designs may address both of these concerns by stimulating 
demand in a way that allows for econometrically sound program evaluation. Resulting estimates 
may be less than ideal, as they may not describe impacts on the population of greatest interest. 
But they can allow for estimation of significant impacts, something that might not be possible 
under a randomization of eligibility, and thus increase what we know about the benefits of index 
insurance. Future research might examine how randomized encouragements can aid in the 
learning process. Information treatments may be helpful for stimulating demand, but perhaps 
nothing is more powerful than creating economic incentives strong enough to push individuals to 
buy index insurance and learn about its benefits through their own experiences. This would 
likely require a lengthy commitment on the part of researchers, as learning about the distribution 
of payouts is a process that cannot be accomplished in a single growing season. But it may be 
necessary if the promise of index insurance is to be realized. 33
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Appendix
Demand for AYI and the parameters of the AYI contract
Recall that farmers who purchase AYI must have values of i  lying within the following 
interval:
 







































   
(1’)
Where x=        
2 2 2 2 2 2
, I I c c c w l                . The derivative of the upper bound of (1’) 
with respect to





























which has an indeterminate sign, or















If the derivative is (3’), the lower bound may be increasing, but at a rate slower than that of the 
upper bound; the difference between (18) and (19) is always negative. Increasing the risk 
reduction potential of AYI via a higher value of
c I   , will weakly increase demand for insurance.
The derivative of the upper bound with respect to the variance of the indemnity,
2







The derivative of the lower bound with respect to
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c I  
(7’)
depending on which lower bound is used. The size interval is therefore decreasing with respect 
to
2
I  . 
Lastly, we have the loading term l and its impact on the interval given in (1’). The 
























depending on which lower bound is used. The size of the interval is a decreasing function of the 
loading term, l. 
Farmer errors and the AYI contract
Suppose that farmers believe the mean of area-yields to be
*  , where g    
* . Given 
this error, the perceived covariate shock is
* * *
t c q     , where  
* *
  q E . Given this error with 37
respect to the mean of area-yields, the AYI contract that replaces shortfalls in area-yields 
from is perceived as:
  g I
ct t  
* * , 0 max  (11’)
while the true contract is:
 
ct t I  , 0 max  (12’)
The variance of area-yields given farmer errors is assumed to be identical to that of true area-
yields. This implies that the distributions of c  and
*
c  are identical. When we evaluate the 
moments of
*
c  as they pertain to the AYI contract, we can use the distribution of c  , as long as 
we account for the fact that the incorrectly perceiving the mean of area yields leads farmers to 
view the strike point of the contract as higher than it actually is. 
While it is proved in the main text that incorrectly perceiving the mean of area-yields 
leads farmers to view AYI as more costly, we cannot unequivocally say that it leads AYI to be 
viewed as less risk-reducing. The true change in the variance of output due to purchasing AYI is:
c I i I     ,
2 2  (13’)
Replacing I and c  with I
* and
*
c  yields the perceived change in variance. Consider the covariance 
between the indemnity and the covariate shock. The true value of this parameter is:
         
   
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    
(14’)38
Under the subjective distribution of area-yields, the covariance term is:
         
       
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(15’)
The last line of (14’) is larger than the last line of (15’); i.e., the true covariance is larger than the 
covariance given the incorrectly perceived mean. 
Ambiguity with respect to the risk reduction potential of AYI comes from the impact of 
the misperceived mean of area-yields on the variance of the indemnity. The true variance of the 
indemnity function is equal to:
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The second to last line follows from the symmetry of c  , i.e.,   0  c P  =   0  c P  .
Using similar reasoning, it can be shown that under the subjective mean of area-yields
*  , 
the variance of the indemnity is:39
     













Since   g P c   >   g P c   , the second term in the right hand side of (17’) may increase the 
variance of the indemnity, even though
2 *   <
2  . However, raising the truncation point of a 
distribution decreases the truncated variance, and as a result     0 0 |
2   c c P
c    >
    g P g c c c      |
2 . Incorrectly perceiving the mean of area-yields unequivocally lowers the 
covariance between the indemnity and the covariate shock, but it may also decrease the variance 
of the indemnity. 
Farmer errors and demand for AYI
The impact of farmer errors on demand will depend on the derivatives of the bounds of 
the set of i  values given in (1’) for which purchasing AYI is optimal with respect to g. For 
convenience, the bounds on this set are restated here:
 
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The derivative of the first possible lower bound of this set with respect to g is:















































The sign of the left hand bracketed term in the numerator is ambiguous. If it is positive, then this 
possible lower bound is increasing with respect to g. 40
Now we consider the other potential lower bound of the set, as well as the upper bound. 
Since
2
c   >0 and g
c I  
 
,
* <0, the sign of derivatives of the other two bounds with respect to g
will depend on g x  
* . This derivative is:







































The sign of the bracketed term in the numerator is also ambiguous. Comparing the different 
derivatives upon which the signs of (18’) and (19’) depend (i.e.,  g h   , g
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Figure 2: Area-yields in Pisco by Zone, 1997-2009
Table 1: Self-reported yields by zone in normal, good, and bad years (kg/ha).
Normal Good Bad
Parte Alta 2,253.76 2,808.11 1,277.5542
Parte Media 2,108.59 2,668.18 1,187.05
Parte Baja 2,276.74 2,826.07 1,276.12
Table 2: Parameter Values for Economic Model.
 =1,852 kg  =1 2
  =1.57
2
c   =160,528 kg
2 2
I  =54,711 kg
2 r=159 kg
2
i   =242,068 kg
2
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Figure 5: Magnitude and Precision of the PRTE with Farmer Errors44
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Figure 6: Precision and Bias of the LATE.